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SUMMARY 
• Although debates over Chinese soft power have increased in 
recent years, there is no shared definition of what ‘soft power’ 
actually means. The definition seems to change depending on 
what the observer wants to argue. 
• External analyses of soft power often include a focus on 
economic relations and other material (hard) sources of power 
and influence. 
• Many Chinese analyses of soft power focus on the promotion of a 
preferred (positive) understanding of China’s interests and 
identities overseas. 
• Unpacking broad and inclusive definitions of soft power allows for 
the identification of different types and sources of power including 
national image promotion, normative power promotion and 
‘imagined power’. 
• China’s emergence as an alternative economic partner seems to 
be the major source of attraction for other developing states, 
though it remains difficult to separate hard material factors from 
softer attraction to values and world-views. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an article in Survival in 2006, Bates Gill and Huang Yanzhong expressed 
surprise that China’s soft power was not the subject of more attention.1 In the 
following years, assessing the sources and extent of Chinese soft power has 
become a major talking point both within and outside China. It has even 
become part of official Chinese discourse and policy through the active 
promotion of positive images and ideas of what China ‘is’ and what it stands 
for. It is a topic that is discussed from different perspectives in different places 
for different reasons: inside and outside China; from those who write about 
Chinese policy and those who actually make policy (whether in China or in 
response to China); in government and academic communities; and in 
popular publications, editorials and commentaries in newspapers and 
magazines intended to influence publics and/or policy-makers.  
Given this diversity, it is not surprising that perceptions of the strength of 
Chinese soft power vary considerably. Analyses cover the whole spectrum of 
thinking, from warnings that China is challenging the dominance of liberal 
norms of domestic and global governance by creating a new ‘model’ or 
‘consensus’, to arguments that China’s normative and ideational appeal is 
negative and repels rather than attracts. Equally divergent is the basic 
understanding of what ‘soft power’ actually is in the first place. Indeed, 
understanding of whether China has significant global soft power or not 
seems largely to depend on how soft power is being defined. Or perhaps it is 
the other way round: the message that the author is trying to get across 
conditions the definition of what soft power is. Indeed, the more the term is 
used with such different interpretations, the more meaningless it becomes. 
 
                                                     
1
 Gill, B. and Huang Yanzhong (2006), ‘Sources and Limits of Chinese “Soft Power”’, Survival, 
48(2): 17–36. 
Programme Paper: The Soft Notion of China’s ‘Soft Power’ 
www.chathamhouse.org.uk     4  
At the risk of oversimplification, the wider the definition of ‘soft’ power the 
more chances there are of finding (multiple) threats to the West. And it seems 
that those who want to alert (maybe alarm) their audience are the most likely 
to use broad definitions including elements of finance, economics and 
diplomacy that would normally fall within considerations of ‘harder’ sources of 
power. Such broad definitions render the concept of ‘soft power’ all but 
useless as a means of distinguishing between different dimensions of power. 
Material scientists use Moh’s scale to distinguish between ten different 
degrees of hardness in minerals. Some approaches to Chinese power seem 
to have only two degrees, with military power conceived of as ‘hard’ and 
everything else grouped together as ‘soft’.  
The whole point about identifying soft power in the first place was to make 
distinctions; to identify different potential sources of power other than force, 
influence and persuasion.2 But simply combining numerous non-military 
elements together under a single ‘soft’ definition does not allow for nuanced 
understandings of different typologies and sources of power, nor does it allow 
policy-makers to develop a range of responses (rather than a single 
response) to different sources of power.  
                                                     
2
 The concept was established by Joseph Nye in Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of 
American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990)) and further developed in ‘Soft Power’: The 
Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 
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UNPACKING CHINESE SOFT POWER 
The emergence of soft-power discourse(s) 
Before the turn of the millennium, sightings of Chinese soft power were 
extremely rare.3 But as China began to expand its commercial and diplomatic 
contacts with other developing states, analysts began to shift their attention 
away from traditional ‘hard’ sources of power and influence. Even though 
many have been critical of the basic ideas put forward by Joshua Cooper 
Ramo in Beijing Consensus, its publication in 2004 did much to focus 
attention on the idea of a Chinese alternative to the Western liberal order 
(including within China itself). The following year, a hearing of the US House 
of Representatives Sub-Committee on Africa, Global Human Rights and 
International Operations on ‘China’s Influence in Africa’ included 
considerations of soft power.4 Although the sub-committee concluded that 
China did not pose a particularly large threat to US interests, it expressed a 
concern that China’s willingness to deal with anybody irrespective of their 
political system might ‘undo’ the progress towards democracy that the United 
States had been promoting in Africa.  
However, much of the early interest in the extent and expansion of soft power 
focused on Asia after the development of a more conciliatory Chinese policy 
towards its Southeast Asian neighbours in the 1990s.5 This included an op-ed 
in the Wall Street Journal by the originator of the concept, Joseph Nye, which 
inspired considerable debate (particularly in the United States) on the 
potential Chinese soft-power challenge to the existing East Asian regional  
                                                     
3
 An important exception was Rosemary Foot’s 1997 analysis of Sino-US relations, which 
considered different dimensions of Chinese power including soft power attraction since 1949. 
Foot, R. (1997), The Practice of Power: US Relations with China Since 1949 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
4
 See http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa22658.000/hfa22658_0f.htm. The hearing 
included a submission by Drew Thompson, written in 2004, that explicitly used soft power to refer 
to China’s growing influence on the continent. Thompson, D. (2004), ‘Economic Growth and “Soft 
Power”: China's Africa Strategy’, Jamestown Foundation China Brief 4 (24).  
5
 For an early example, see Garrison, J. (2005), ‘China's Prudent Cultivation of ''Soft'' Power and 
Implications for U.S. Policy in East Asia’, Asian Affairs 32 (1): 25-30. 
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order.6 There was the evidence, according to one of the earliest proponents of 
China’s soft power, that ‘Beijing is laying the foundations for a new regional 
order with China as the natural leader and the United States as the outsider’.7 
As with Joshua Kurlantzick’s book Charm Offensive, published in 2007, these 
studies tended to deploy broad definitions of soft power that included 
diplomacy and the use of economic relations as a means of achieving 
objectives of power politics. 8  
Within China itself, interest in soft power really began to emerge at about the 
same time. It has become a common issue in official Chinese policy, a 
popular source of discussion on internet sites, and one of the hot topics of 
Chinese academia.9 Indeed, according to Wang Yiwei, a Chinese scholar who 
has also worked within the Chinese Mission to the EU, ‘few Western 
international relations phrases have penetrated as deeply or broadly into the 
Chinese vocabulary in recent years’.10 Perspectives and conclusions vary 
quite considerably. What China’s leaders say on the subject clearly influences 
how others define and discuss the issue, but this is not a homogeneous 
discourse with everybody falling in line behind official policy. In particular, 
there are widely varying evaluations of the extent to which China has such 
power; and if it lacks it, how it should go about getting it.  
But while accepting that trying to generalize about such a range of words and 
writings is not only very difficult, but in some ways misrepresents the diversity 
of thinking in China, there does seem to be a relatively widely shared 
understanding of what ‘soft power’ means. It is seen largely as a project to 
internationalize the voice of China so that it penetrates into popular 
                                                     
6
 Nye, J. (2005), ‘The Rise of China’s Soft Power’, Wall Street Journal, 29 December. 
7
  Windybank, S. (2005), ‘The China Syndrome’, Policy, 21(2): 28. 
8
 Kurlantzick, J. (2007), Charm Offensive: How China’s ‘Soft Power’ Is Transforming the World 
(New Haven: Yale University Press). 
9
 There are a number of good analyses of the development of debates in China. See Li Mingjiang 
(2008) ‘China Debates ‘Soft Power’’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 2(2): 287–-308; 
Huang Yanzhong and Sheng Ding (2006), ‘Dragon’s Underbelly: An Analysis of China’s “Soft 
Power’’’, East Asia: An International Journal 23(4): 22–44,;Cho, Young Nam and Jeong, Jong Ho 
(2008), ‘China's “Soft Power’’’, Asia Survey 48(3): 453–72, and Sheng Ding (2008), The Dragon’s 
Hidden Wings: How China Rises with its ‘Soft Power (Lexington: Lanham). 
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consciousness and influences policy communities debating the 
consequences of China’s rise. It is an attempt to promote a preferred Chinese 
idea of what China is and what it stands for, including an emphasis on the 
historical roots of current thinking, identity-formation and policy designed to 
correct misconceptions among overseas audience about Chinese motivations 
and intentions. By bringing more people across the world into contact with 
Chinese understandings and preferences, and by explaining their source, the 
hope is that people will become more accepting of them – ultimately, perhaps, 
they might even share and support them, but the aim at least in the short run 
is for them not to be found worrying and/or offensive. 
This understanding tends to see soft power as something that needs to be 
actively promoted, rather than something that states and/or societies simply 
have. This places an emphasis on the projection of soft power as a state 
project: something in which individuals can play a role, but essentially a 
project that is actively promoted (and funded) by the state. This occurs 
through the (partial) funding of the study of Chinese language and culture in 
88 different countries, through the internationalization of Chinese media 
organizations such as China Radio International, CCTV and foreign-language 
editions of the People’s Daily, and through high-profile events that put China 
in the global spotlight (like the Beijing Olympics). A great example is the video 
produced by the State Council Information Office showing the preferred 
official version of a happy, multicultural, inclusive and globally responsible 
China.11  
Of course, both Chinese and external discussions about soft power consider 
other elements and issues as well. But at the very least, this brief outline of 
the emergence of soft power debates shows that people are thinking about 
Chinese power using the same term but meaning very different things by it; 
                                                                                                                              
10
  Wang Yiwei (2008), ‘Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese ‘Soft Power’’’, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 616(1): 258. 
11
 http://tinyurl.com/sciovid. 
Programme Paper: The Soft Notion of China’s ‘Soft Power’ 
www.chathamhouse.org.uk     8  
hence the need to exercise great care when venturing into these debates. So 
how can we best try to unpack soft power into its different constituent 
elements? 
The first step is to strip out economic bases of power. As we shall see shortly, 
it is hard to wholly separate the appeal of China as an economic partner from 
the specific type of economic partner that China wants to be seen as. But in 
the first instance at least, there does not seem to be anything ‘soft’ about 
wanting to develop good relations with China: to take advantage of its market, 
to attract Chinese investment and to build trade relations. This then leaves 
four interrelated but nevertheless separate varieties of what we might call 
China’s ‘non-hard’ power: 
• ‘soft power’, understood as the latent power of attraction;  
• proactive ‘national image promotion’; 
• ‘normative power promotion’; and  
• ‘imagined power’. 
Soft power 
Here soft power is conceived as the idea that others will align themselves to 
you and your policy preferences because they are attracted to your political 
and social system, values and policies. Ironically given all that has been 
written and said about China’s soft power, it is here that most assessments of 
broadly defined ‘soft power’ appear to agree that China seems to have least 
purchase vis-à-vis other states and systems. Indeed, there is a strong case 
for saying that China’s system repels rather than attracts (an understanding 
that is not lost on Chinese scholars and officials). 
But while China might not immediately attract in this way, there is something 
nonetheless attractive about the country, particularly for elites in developing 
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states in some parts of the world. Its record of economic growth and poverty-
reduction is impressive, and the fact that this has been achieved without 
giving in to Western pressures to reform and politically liberalize is particularly 
attractive to those who would like to achieve the same in their own countries. 
It should be noted that admiration and the desire to emulate China’s 
successes do not necessarily equate with the desire to emulate the Chinese 
political and social model as well as the economic model (or more correctly, 
their successful parts). While there are clear lessons that can be learnt from 
the way in which China engaged the global economy, the attraction of the 
Chinese system and values may be less important than the idea of China as 
a metaphor for ‘doing it your own way’ or an example of what can be done.  
Under this definition, soft power can be conceived of as being ‘passive’ – it is 
simply there. Or put another way, soft power is in the eye of the beholder; it 
emerges from how outsiders perceive a country’s values and systems from 
rather than being promoted from the inside. And this suggests that we should 
conceive of passive, externally given soft power defined as attraction as 
somewhat different from state-led projects deliberately constructed to 
promote a preferred national image overseas.  
National image promotion 
As already noted, in Chinese debates over soft power the emphasis is often 
on how to ensure that Chinese voices are heard more clearly overseas in an 
attempt to impose a preferred national image on debates over China’s global 
role and future projection of power. Of course, this is not a unique Chinese 
project. Many countries use state funding and state agencies to promote an 
image and idea of that country overseas, and some have been doing it for 
much longer than China. The point here is not to criticize China, but to point 
out that the concerted effort by a powerful state to create a national image to 
influence others is not the same as soft power defined as passive, inherent 
attraction. So in keeping with the idea of unpacking different dimensions of 
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non-hard power, it is considered here to be a second and different dimension 
of power.  
Indeed, it is not just that this state project is different from the passive 
attraction of soft power, but that it was in part at least inspired by China’s lack 
of soft-power attraction. It was built on a realization that the current system 
and Chinese values (as understood overseas at least) were a potential 
source of weakness that might turn others away from China and/or lead them 
to fear its intentions and the consequences of its rise. Convincing everybody 
that China’s rise should be supported might not be possible, but assuaging 
concerns, reducing opposition and winning over new friends was a realistic 
ambition. If China’s values and system were not to attract, then at least 
perhaps they might not repel.  
This project has entailed looking backwards to what China once was and the 
creation of a somewhat idealized historical Golden Age. This is most visibly 
associated with Confucius, through the establishment of Confucius Institutes 
and Classrooms overseas, and with the unveiling of a nearly 10-metre-high 
statue of the Great Teacher in Beijing in January 2011. In reality, the virtues 
and values that are at the heart of this Golden Age have a much wider base, 
incorporating elements of Daoism and Sun Zi’s ‘The Art of War’. But as 
‘Confucianism’ itself owes at least as much to the later interpretations of 
Confucius by Mencius and other scholars as it does to the verifiable writings 
of Confucius himself, it is appropriate that he has become a symbol for a 
diverse body of thinking. 
So the past is being constructed to serve the present. This seems to be partly 
because it builds on existing interests in Chinese history and traditions in 
many parts of the world; it plays to the attraction of China as what it was 
rather than what it is. But it is also because it can be used to build a basis for 
understanding the way China is today: why it acts in the way that it does and 
how it will act in the future. It is a means of explaining ‘difference’ – a different 
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understanding of the relationship between the individual and the state, a 
different understanding of how society is ordered and functions, and a 
different understanding of the nature and purpose of government – different 
from the dominant Anglo-European model of individualism and liberalism. 
Normative power promotion 
National image promotion, then, is a deliberate state-led project designed to 
promote a preferred idea of China’s underlying values, cultures and principles 
by creating an idealized historical starting point. It is this idea of China that 
those charged with promoting China’s image overseas hope will attract others 
(or at least not repel them) rather than the contemporary political order. It is 
also informed by the idea that the more people know about China, the more 
they will accept why it acts in the way it does – for example, over issues such 
as Tibet or Taiwan.  
This focus on history also helps explain China’s ‘different’ behaviour as an 
international actor. While this project shares the goal of increasing the 
attraction of Chinese values, it also attempts to appeal to others through the 
promotion of an alternative view of how the global order should be 
constructed and how international relations should be conducted. Put another 
way, if China is given the chance to create an international order to its liking, 
then it will be an international order which concretely and materially benefits 
other states (particularly non-Western and developing states). Thus, though it 
shares elements of national image promotion, it goes further than this and is 
considered here to constitute a separate (though clearly linked) third 
‘Normative Power Promotion’ element of Chinese non-hard power.  
For international relations theorists such as John Mearsheimer, the key to 
understanding the implications of China’s rise was to look backwards to how 
other rising great powers (including the United States) have acted. For 
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Mearsheimer, the result of this historical analysis is that if China continues to 
rise, then the consequences cannot be peaceful: 
Why should we expect China to act any differently than the 
United States did? Are they more principled than we are? 
More ethical? Less nationalistic? Less concerned about their 
survival? They are none of these things, of course, which is 
why China is likely to imitate the United States and attempt to 
become a regional hegemon.12 
The Chinese response is that China will act differently precisely because it is 
different. Western theories have been developed by studying Western 
experiences and are based on Western liberal traditions. Because of its 
unique historical roots, culture(s) and philosophies, China will not act/behave 
like the United States or Germany or Britain or other previous Great Powers. 
Rather, it will be a ‘responsible great power’ based on a cultural predilection 
for peace and harmony – just as it was when China was last in a position of 
ascendancy and power in Asia before the arrival of the West.  
So China is a ‘different’ type of actor in international relations; one that is not 
seeking to impose its world-view on others, and a power that believes each 
country is free to do what it wants within its own sovereign territory. Its 
preferred world order is one that allows for plurality and democracy built on its 
historical cultural predilection for harmony, virtue and society. Of course, to be 
different, you have to be different from something – and the ‘other’ in this 
case is a constructed image of the current world order as dominated by an 
interventionist unilateralist West that has imposed itself across the world – by 
force if necessary – in pursuit of materialistic (individualistic) goals. By saying 
that China does not have a normative position, and defining this against the 
dominant normative position of the West (or is it really just the United 
States?), then this ‘non-normative ideology’ ironically becomes a normative 
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position in itself. In this respect, it is not so much what China is that is 
important as what it is not. Thus the attraction of China and China’s preferred 
view of international relations is predicated on the prior decline of the 
legitimacy of the ‘Western’ liberal global order – particularly in those states 
that had been subject to ‘conditional’ relations with either powerful Western 
states or international financial institutions (or both) and even more 
particularly after the invasion of Iraq. 
On (not) separating the hard from the soft 
Having argued earlier for the need to take economic relations out of the soft- 
power equation, we now need to bring them back in again, because the 
importance of this normative power is enhanced when it is combined with 
harder financial incentives. To put it bluntly, when China comes calling to do 
business, it does so without any liberalizing strings attached. To be sure, 
Chinese investors are increasingly looking for the same guarantees for their 
investments that others have long been seeking. And not recognizing Taiwan 
remains a bottom line for continued relations of any sort. But there is certainly 
no demand to put in place a neoliberal economic order and a liberal 
democratic political system in order to have commercial relations with China. 
Here once again we see the importance of China defined as what it is not. 
This linkage between economic and normative power makes it all but 
impossible to determine the major source of Chinese power. Are African 
states prepared to deal with China because of its various forms of non-hard 
appeal and image promotion, or for more material reasons? Is the increased 
number of people studying Chinese a reflection of their admiration of what 
China is today, to learn more about what it was before, or to make it easier to 
be part of (and benefit from) China’s ongoing transformation? Similarly, it is 
easy to look at Southeast Asia, for example, and argue that the region is 
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 Online paper available at http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0034b.pdf. 
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engaging China because of the success of China’s international political 
marketing, or the appeal of its normative position, or both. It is even possible 
to argue, as Kurlantzick did, that ‘the appeal of China as an economic model’ 
provided the basis for the creation of the ASEAN–China free trade 
agreement.13  But it is equally possible (at least) to suggest that if China’s rise 
is inevitable, then it makes sense for the region to do what it can to make the 
most of the new regional order for pragmatic material and/or national 
interests.  
Imagined power 
This brings us to the final form of China’s non-hard power. Even after three 
decades of reform, it is still not so much what China has become that is the 
focus of attention, as what it will become in the future. The word ‘will’ is 
deliberately used instead of ‘might’, as China’s future rise has been taken for 
granted by many. As a result, there has long been a tendency to develop 
policies towards China today based on the power that it is expected to have in 
the future. Thus China has been empowered by the way in which others think 
about it; perceptions have altered realities. But these external perceptions of 
China are not based on the supposed soft-power attraction of culture and 
values. Rather, China’s imagined power is typically built on assessments of 
growing material power and clout – particularly China’s future economic 
power.  
It is this imagined power that has played an important role in shaping how 
many in Southeast Asia responded to China’s initiatives towards the region. 
Developing policies based on an understanding of China’s future power also 
seems to have influenced European policies towards China. And predicting 
China’s future abilities in an attempt to influence policy has been a major 
priority of much policy-related research in the US for many years. This is not 
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 Kurlantzick, J. (2006), ‘China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese “Soft Power’’’, Carnegie 
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necessarily a negative phenomenon – having foresight and planning for the 
future is a good thing. Perhaps it becomes a problem when considerations of 
what China might become and a range of possible scenarios are replaced by 
a single version of the future which becomes accepted as the truth and other 
possibilities are discounted. But even if they are proved right in the long term, 
China has been externally (prematurely) imbued with power for reasons other 
than attraction to values and system – and in terms of relations with China’s 
Asian neighbours in particular, it seems that this imagined power has at times 
been interpreted as soft power.  
Conclusions 
Of the four different dimensions, ‘imagined power’ is becoming increasingly 
irrelevant through the narrowing of the gap between imagining what China’s 
future power might be and the actual real hard and material sources of power 
that China already possesses. For the other three, the promotion of an idea of 
what China is and what it stands for will be filtered by actual experiences of 
how China acts. There is something of an emerging consensus that there has 
been a more ‘assertive’ tone in official discourses since the global crisis, 
which has reignited existing concerns about China’s long-term ambitions; 
concerns that the focus on national image promotion were designed to allay 
in the first place. And the ‘China’ that acts is not just the Chinese state. As the 
number of Chinese traders, workers, managers (and maybe even tourists) 
overseas increases, then how they interact with local communities will play an 
ever more important role in shaping perceptions of China (whether they are 
representatives of state companies or not).  
But the main intention of this paper was not to evaluate the extent of Chinese 
soft power, but to question the efficacy of deploying ill-thought-out and catch-
all definitions. Quite simply, if we want to understand the potential sources of 
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why other countries act in relation to China, making a simple division between 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power is a very blunt instrument. In particular, while there are 
indeed ideational and normative drivers for the way in which others treat 
China, to think that this is a reflection of a growing admiration of (and 
attraction to) the current Chinese political and social order might be going too 
far in many cases. Attraction to the Chinese economic record (and a desire to 
emulate the positive elements of it) is another matter altogether. And the 
desire to become tied to China’s ‘inevitable’ economic future is even more 
important. In short, it is easy to infer soft power, as a number of studies and 
policy analyses seem to have done, when harder material sources of 
influence have arguably been more important.  
While it is indeed possible to consider economic issues under the umbrella of 
something that is very broadly defined as ‘soft power’, to do so says little 
about what is actually driving different policies towards China. And in the 
process it actually makes it harder to say anything useful about the real and 
varied bases of Chinese power in the international order. The concept was 
designed to make us think again about what gives states/countries/societies 
power in the first place – and broad understandings and definitions of 
Chinese soft power do not allow us to do so.  
 
Programme Paper: The Soft Notion of China’s ‘Soft Power’ 
www.chathamhouse.org.uk     17  
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 
Professor Shaun Breslin is an Associate Fellow of the Asia Programme at 
Chatham House and Director of the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and 
Regionalisation at the University of Warwick. His research focuses on the 
political economy of contemporary China and comparative regional 
integration.  
Programme Paper: The Soft Notion of China’s ‘Soft Power’ 
www.chathamhouse.org.uk     18  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
An earlier version of this paper first appeared in ETHOS (Issue 8, August 
2010, pp. 5–11), a biannual publication of the Centre for Governance and 
Leadership, Civil Service College, Singapore.  For more information, please 
visit www.cscollege.gov.sg/ethos. 
